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TAX-FREE LIQUIDATION OF A SUBSIDIARY:
RESURRECTION OF THE KIMBELL-
DIAMOND DOCTRINE
If corporation X purchases the assets of corporation Y, the basis of
those assets to X is their cost.1 Y's shareholders, however, may prefer a
sale of their stock to a sale of Y's assets. 2 If X buys Y's stock and later
liquidates Y, the basis of the assets X acquires depends upon whether
the liquidation is taxable. 3 If it is, the basis is the fair market value of
the assets. 4 But if the liquidation of Y is tax-free,5 Y's basis will normally
be carried over to the parent corporation, X.6 The only exceptions to
this carryover basis for property received in a tax-free liquidation of a
corporation are the statutory exception of section 334(b)(2), 7 which
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1012 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
2 Under the 1939 Code, the sale of Y's assets would result in double taxation: Y would
pay a tax on any gain and Y's shareholders would pay tax on their dividends. A liquida-
tion of Y followed by a sale of the assets by the shareholders might still have been doubly
taxed. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). Despite the enactment
of CODE § 337, intended to overrule the Court Holding case, it may still be advantageous
for the shareholders to sell their stock rather than having Y sell its assets. See Levin,
Purchase and Sale of Corporate Businesses: Tax Opportunities and Pitfalls, 35 TAXES 942,
943 (1957).
3 The 1954 Code states that, as a general rule, "Amounts distributed in complete
liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock."
CODE § 331(a)(1). It also provides a rule for determination of the amount of gain or loss
to the distributee. Id. § 1001.
4 Id. § 334(a).
5 Id. §§ 332, 333. This note is concerned with § 332 liquidations only.
6 Id. § 334(b)(1).
7 CODE § 334(b) provides as follows:
(I) IN GENERAL-If property is received by a corporation in a distribution
in complete liquidation of another corporation (within the meaning of section
332(b)), then, except as provided in paragraph (2), the basis of the property in the
hands of the distributee shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the
transferor. If property is received by a corporation in a transfer to which section
332(c) applies, and if paragraph (2) of this subsection does not apply, then the
basis of the property in the hands of the transferee shall be the same as it would
be in the hands of the transferor.
(2) EXcEPIO.-If property is received by a corporation in a distribution in
complete liquidation of another corporation (within the meaning of section
332(b)), and if-
(A) the distribution is pursuant to a plan of liquidation adopted-
(i) on or after June 22, 1954, and
(ii) not more than 2 years after the date of the transaction described
in subparagraph (B) (or, in the case of a series of transactions, the date
of the last such transaction); and
(B) stock of the distributing corporation possessing at least 80 percent
of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, and
at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock
(except non-voting stock which is limited and preferred as to dividends),
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provides for a cost-of-stock basis if its conditions are met, and the
Kimbell-Diamond doctrine.8 This case law doctrine, developed before
the enactment of section 334(b)(2), required a cost basis if the parent's
intent in purchasing a subsidiary was to acquire its assets. The recent
decision of the Court of Claims in American Potash & Chemical Corp.
v. United States,9 holding that the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine is still
applicable to corporate purchasers who have not complied with section
334(b)(2), restores some of the uncertainty which existed prior to the
enactment of that section and suggests a possible problem with carry-
over of tax attributes under section 381.
I
THE Kimbell-Diamond Docu2NE
In Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co.'0 the taxpayer corporation pur-
chased all the stock of the Whaley Mill & Elevator Company and liqui-
dated Whaley. Whaley's adjusted basis was greater than the cost of the
stock to Kimbell-Diamond." The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's
contention that the 1939 Code required a carryover basis42 and held
was acquired by the distributee by purchase (as defined in paragraph (5))
during a 12-month period beginning with the earlier of,
(i) the date of the first acquisition by purchase of such stock, or
(ii) if any of such stock was acquired in an acquisition which is a
purchase within the meaning of the second sentence of paragraph (8),
the date on which the distributee is first considered under section 318(a)
as owning stock owned by the corporation from which such acquisition
was made,
then the basis of the property in the hands of the distributee shall be the adjusted
basis of the stock with respect to which the distribution was made. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his
delegate, proper adjustment in the adjusted basis of any stock shall be made for
any distribution made to the distributee with respect to such stock before the
adoption of the plan of liquidation, for any money received, for any liabilities
assumed or subject to which the property was received, and for other items.
8 The doctrine is derived from Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd
per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 842 U.S. 827 (1951), although it was first
stated in Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
806 U.S. 661 (1939).
9 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. g 9472, modified, 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9650 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
10 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 842 U.S.
827 (1951).
11 Although the price received by Whaley's shareholders for their stock was greater
than the adjusted basis of Whaley's assets, part of the purchase price was insurance money
received by Kimbell-Diamond for property destroyed by fire. The cost of the stock was
computed as the basis of Kimbell-Diamond's lost assets plus the amount paid in excess
of the insurance, and thus the adjusted basis was larger than the cost basis. Id. at 80.
12 14 T.C. at 80. Section 112(b)(6) of the 1939 Code provided for non-recognition of
gain or loss for assets received by a corporation in a distribution pursuant to a complete
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that "the purchase of Whaley's stock and its subsequent liquidation
must be considered .s one transaction, namely, the purchase of Whaley's
assets,. ,,"a The basis of the assets acquired by Kimbell-Diamond was,
therefore, the cost of the Whaley stock.14
The Kimbel!-Diamond doctrine has been described as "an excep-
tion to the general rule that a carryover basis is required when a cor-
poration is completely liquidated." 15 The rationale of the decisions
under the 1939 Code finding a cost basis applicable was that substance
should prevail over form, and that what "really happened" was a pur-
chase of assets.16 The Kimbell-DiamQnd doctrine was thus a particular
application of the step-transaction doctrine,17 which has been described
as follows:
It has been said too often to warrant citation that taxation is an
intensely practical matter, and that the substance of the thing done
and not the form it took must govern. ... And without regard to
whether the result is imposition or relief from taxation, the courts
have recognized that where the essential nature of a transaction
is the acquisition of property, it will be viewed as a whole, and
closely related steps will not be separated either at the instance of
the taxpayer or the taxing authority.18
Although the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine seemed correct in princi-
ple, its application proved troublesome. In order to achieve a cost basis
it was necessary to show that the 'intent 19 of the purchasing corpora-
tion was at all times to acquire assets. 20 In KimbellDiamond the intent
was clear; Whaley was liquidated within a week after its purchase2l and
Kimbell-Diamond's corporate minutes22 reflected a desire to acquire
liquidation of another corporatio . Section 1li(a)(l5) Qf the !959 Code provided for a
carryover basis upon distributions covered by § 112(b)(6). There was no statutory excep-
tion to § 113(a)(i5),
13 14 T.C. at 80.
14 Id.
15 American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 68-9 U.S. Tax Cas. 9472, at
87,632 (Ct, Cl. 1968).
16 See, e.g., United States v. M.Oj. Corp., 274 F.2d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 1960). The
sellers, however, are not treated as if they had sold assets, since doing so would make their
tax burden depend on the purchaser's intent.
17 See Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 1954
INsT. ON FED. TAX. 247, 282. For an application of the step-transaction doctrine to a seller,
see Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 381 (1945). But see CODE § 337, and note
2 supra.
18 Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939).
19 See generally Fischer, Intent and Taxes, 32 TAxES 303 (1954).
20 See, e.g., Koppers Coal Co., 6 T.C. 1209, 1218 (1946).
21 14 T.C. at 76-77.
22 For a discussion of the importance of corporate minutes in tax litigation, see
Tarleau, The Role of Corporate Minutes in Taxation, U. So. CAL. 1957 TAx. INsT. 1.
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Whaley's mill to replace one of its own.23 Related factors, such as an
attempt to purchase assets directly or the "stripping down" of the ac-
quired corporation, may also demonstrate the requisite intent.24 But
because the doctrine was based upon the subjective foundation of
intent, in many cases the tax consequences of a liquidation could be
determined only by litigation.
II
THE STATUTORY EXCEPTION TO TIE CARRYOVER
BASIS--SEcTioN 834(b)(2)
Unlike its predecessor, the 1954 Code contains rules which provide
for a cost basis in certain corporate purchase and liquidation situa-
tions.25 If a liquidation is tax-free under section 332,2o the general rule
is that a carryover basis is required.27 However, if the detailed require-
ments of section 334(b)(2)28 are met, the basis is the cost of the acquired
stock, subject to adjustments required by the regulations." For this sec-
tion to apply to a liquidation, the subsidiary must be completely liqui-
dated, the parent must have purchased eighty percent or more of the
subsidiary's stock within a twelve-month period,3 0 and the liquidation
must be pursuant to a plan adopted within two years of the stock
purchase.3 1 If a purchaser complies with section 334(b)(2), intent is
irrelevant.32
Because there has been almost no litigation involving the Section,
334(b)(2) has been considered an improvement over the Kimbell-
23 14 T.C. at 75-76.
24 For a discussion of the factors which may be important in determining corporate
intent in a Kimbell-Diamond situation, see Lewis, Cost-Of-Stock Basis For Assets Received
from Acquired Corporation, 19 U. MUAMI L. Rv. 159, 163-69 (1964).
25 CODk § 334(b). The Kimbell-Diamond doctrine is applicable to individual as well
as corporate purchasers. See, e.g., Ruth M. Cullen, 14 T.C. 368 (1950), acquiesced in, 1950-2
Cua. BuLL. 1.
26 Section 33(a) provides that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized on the receipt
by a corporation of property distributed in complete liquidation of another corporation."
Section 332(b) sets forth detailed requirements which must be met if the section is to
apply. Section 332(c) provides a special rule concerning indebtedness of a subsidiary to its
parent.
27 CoDn § 934(b)(1).
28 The text of § 384(b) is set out in note 7 supya. §'or a guide to the problems of
complying with § 334(b)(-), see O'Malley, The Pitfalls of a Section 334(bX2) Liquidation
and How to Avoid Them, 24 J. TAXATiON 188 (1966).
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.33 4-1(c)(4) (1955).
30 Except for non-voting preferred stock.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(3) (155) gives detailed provisions for determining the date
on which the specified two-year period begins.
32 See Rev. Rul. 262, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 114.
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Diamond doctrine.33 The section has been criticized, however, on the
"form over substance" ground that careful tax planning may allow the
parent corporation to choose whatever basis is highest.3 4
III
THE RESURRECTION OF Kimbell-Diamond
Application of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine to a transaction
which did not meet the requirements of section 334(b)(2) has been
sanctioned by American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States.35
Potash had exchanged, in two separate transactions, a portion of its
stock3 6 for all the stock of Wecco, which it then liquidated. Because
Potash did not acquire eighty percent of Wecco's stock within any
twelve-month period, the requirements of section 334(b)(2)(B) were not
met. Nevertheless, Potash used a cost basis in computing its deprecia-
tion deduction on the assets obtained from Wecco. The court denied
the government's motion for summary judgment and held that section
334(b)(2) had not totally vitiated the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine.37
The decision was based upon an interpretation of the legislative
history of section 334. Since the Senate Finance Committee extensively
changed the House proposals,38 its report3 9 would seem to be the key
document. The report states, with regard to section 334:
Under the House bill, a shareholder would in all cases be per-
mitted to receive the purchase price for his stock as his basis for
the assets distributed to him regardless of the assets' cost to the cor-
poration. In this respect the principle of Kimbell-Diamond Milling
33 See Lewis, supra note 24, at 185.
34 "The courts may be puzzled by a statute which purports to prescribe a definite
rule without the right of election, yet states the rule in such a way that an election is
actually permitted in not one, but many ways." Cohen, Gelbert, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren,
Corporate Liquidations Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 55 CoLurm. L. Rlv. 37,
43-44 (1955) (footnote omitted).
35 68-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9472, modified, 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9650 (Ct. Cl. 1968). It has
been reported that the Government will appeal the decision. 68-18 BNA TAx MGT. MEM.
13 (1968).
36 The court did not reach the question whether the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine
would apply where an exchange of stock rather than a purchase of stock preceded the
liquidation. The court also declined to rule on the effect of Potash having operated
Wecco as a subsidiary for 7 months. It simply said that the doctrine could apply even in
light of § 334(b)(2) and remanded the case. 68-2 U.S. Tax Gas. at 87,634.
37 Id. The court also held that the transaction was not a "creeping B" reorganization
under CODE § 368(a)(1)(B). On petition for rehearing, however, it ruled that the issue
could be relitigated on remand. 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9650.
38 H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 331, 334 (1954).
39 S. REa. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
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Company ... was effectuated. Since the application of the rule of
this case is primarily in the area of liquidations by a parent cor-
poration of its subsidiary, the rule has been limited by your com-
mittee to liquidations of this type.40
The court reasoned that because Congress showed no intent to make
the basis-of-assets choice elective,41 because Kimbell-Diamond remains
viable for individual purchasers, 42 and because Congress would not
have attempted to modify existing case law without clearly stating that
purpose, nothing in the legislative history indicated that Kimbell-
Diamond was "dead.143 The absence of a more definite statement of
purpose, however, may indicate that the Senate was not clearly aware
of the problem and therefore had no specific legislative intent. Thus,
a more appropriate approach would have been to stress the relative
desirability of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine as opposed to an ex-
clusively statutory test.
The juxtaposition of a clear statutory rule in which intent plays
no part44 and a judge-made doctrine in which intent is controlling is
disturbing. If a corporate purchaser desires a cost basis, it can achieve
that goal by compliance with section 334(b)(2). If, however, it is unable
to comply, or if a carryover basis is desired, the purchaser must face the
difficult problem of proving or disproving an intent to acquire assets.
The problem is compounded by the interaction of the doctrine and
section 381 carryovers. That section provides for the carryover of cer-
tain tax attributes of a subsidiary liquidated under section 332.45 There
is, however, an exception for distributions to which section 334(b)(2)
applies.46 Since this exception refers only to the statutory means of
determining basis as cost-of-stock,47 literal application of section 381 in
a Kimbell-Diamond case would result in the parent's having a cost
basis for its acquired assets and a carryover of its subsidiary's tax at-
tributes. The courts will presumably avoid any attempt to use the
Potash holding and section 381 to obtain a double tax benefit by rea-
soning that the application of the step-transaction doctrine makes the
liquidation part of a purchase of assets, thus destroying liquidation
40 Id. at 48.
41 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,633.
42 The court found no congressional intent to differentiate between individuals and
corporations. Id.
43 Id. at 87,633-34.
44 See Rev. Rul. 262, 1960-2 Crm. BULL. 114.
45 The attributes which can be carried over are listed in CODE § 381(c). They include
net operating loss, earnings and profits, and capital losses.
46 Id. § 381(a)(1).
47 Id. § 584(b)(2).
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attributes, 48 If the transaction is viewed as a purchase, sections 832 and
381 would be inapplicable. The legislative history of section 381 sup-
ports such a result; the Senate report states that "whether or not the
items carryover should be based upon economic realities rather than
upon such artificialities as the legal form of the reorganization. ' '49 In
an appropriate case section 269 might also be used to disallow the
catryover. 0
The Kimbell-Diamond doctrine can also be effectively used by the
government. If a corporation has liquidated a recently-purchased sub-
sidiary and carried over its tax attributes, the government could main-
tain that the carryover should be disallowed because the intent of the
parent was to acquire assets. Thus, the resurrection of the Kimbell-
Diamond doctrine may have given the IRS a new tool for disallowing
section 381 carryovers. The difficulty of determining corporate intent
and the fact that an intent to acquire a subsidiary and atl intent to
acquire its assets are by no means mutually exclusive51 make this area
one of considerable uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
Although section 334(b)(2) provides at least one area of certainty
not present under the 1939 Code, uncertainty remains when the re-
quirements of that section are not met. Moreover, section 381 carry-
overs may now provoke litigation. Had Congress, in drafting section
334, fully considered its interaction with existing case law, these prob-
lems could have been avoided. 52
An exclusively statutory test based entirely upon the timing of the
transactions would be both realistic and objective. A cost basis could
be imposed if the liquidation takes place within six months of the
acquisition of control of the liquidated company, with a carryover basis
48 Cf. United States v. M.OJ. Corp., 24 F.2d 713, 717 (5th Cir, 1960). Similar problems
might arise under CoDE 3 37(c)(2), which distinguishes for § 332 liquidation purposes
between § 334(b)(1) and § 334(b)(2) basis determiitioW. In the former case, § 337, Which
provides for non-recognition of gain or loss on sales of property by certain corporations
which have adopted a plan of liquidation, does not apply.
49 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).
50 CODE § 269 provides for disallowance of tax benefits obtained by a corporate
acquisition if the principal purpose of that acquisition was tax avoidance or evasion.
51 See United States v, M.O.J. Corp., 274 F.2d 713, 716-17 (5th Cir. 1960).
52 Whatever the general merits of the House version of the 1954 Code, it would have
eliminated the requirement of intent from this area. See H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
§§ 331, 334 (1954).
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required in all other caes.50 If greater flexibility were desired at the
expense of some predictability, 4 statutory presumption that a purchase
of assets was not intended if the liquidation takes place more than six
months after the purchase might be substituted. 4 Although such an
approach may lack some of the "substance over form" appeal of the
Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, it would provide a predictable and logical
rule, "a consummation devoutly to be wished."55
Alan M. Gunn
53 The Code permits the purchaser to avoid an "automatic" cost-of-stock basis by
spreading the purchase of 80%o of the subsidiary's stock over more than 12 months. CODE
§ 334(b)(2)(B). Requiring a liquidation within 6 months of acquisition of a majority of the
voting shares Would make the section less elective, yet would provide for a cost basis in
dear-cut cases such as Kimbell-Diamond. This would amount to legislative adoption of
the "prompt liquidation" test. Cf. Lewis, supra note 24, at 165: "If the purchase was
truly one of assets, it is natural to assume that the purchaser would wish to acquire the
pssets as soon as possible in order to utilize them as he had intended."
54 The Code adopts an analogous approach ir taxing tr4nifers made in contempla-
tion of death. See CODE § 2035(b).
55 W. SnAKEsPEAiE, HAzsIET, Act III, scene 1.
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